It is common in the study of secure multicast network coding in the presence of an eavesdropper that has access to z network links, to assume that the source node is the only node that generates random keys. In this setting, the secure multicast rate is well understood. Computing the secure multicast rate, or even the secure unicast rate, in the more general setting in which all network nodes may generate (independent) random keys is known to be as difficult as computing the (non-secure) capacity of multiple-unicast network coding instances -a well known open problem. This work treats an intermediate model of secure unicast in which only one node can generate random keys, however that node need not be the source node. The secure communication rate for this setting is characterized again with an eavesdropper that has access to z network links.
I. INTRODUCTION
In this work, we study secure network communication over a directed acyclic network G = (V, E) having a single source node S, a single terminal node T , and a single node K, K = S, which is capable of generating random "keys" independent of the messages generated by S. We employ a notion of secure "wiretap" communication networks introduced by Cai and Yeung in [1] and studied further in, for example [2] - [6] . Under this notion of security and given a communication scheme over G, we consider an edge e ∈ E of the network to be secure in the presence of a wiretap adversary if and only if I(M ; X e ) = 0, where M denotes the source message and X e denotes the information communicated on edge e. 1 To be secure in the presence of an adversary that wiretaps any sizez subset W = {e 1 , · · · , e z } ⊂ E of edges, we require that I(M ; X W ) = 0, where X W = (X e1 , · · · , X ez ).
Given integers R and z, we define a secure network code over the network G to be (R, z)-feasible if it allows information to be communicated from the source S to the terminal T at rate R and, in addition, it secures the network against a wiretap adversary that eavesdrops on up to z edges of the network. Our work entails determining, for each z, the closure of the set of rates that are (R, z)-feasible, thereby deriving the capacity-security region.
When K = S, the capacity-security region for secure multicast network codes is well understood [1] , [2] with several follow up works [3] - [6] that address various methods to alter any given non-secure linear network code into a new code that is secure. In contrast, determining the capacity-security region 1 Detailed definitions of all concepts discussed here and below appear in Section II for secure network codes over a single-source single-terminal network, where every node can generate random keys, is as hard as the problem of characterizing the (non-secure) capacity region of the k-unicast problem as shown by [7] . Results of a similar nature are also presented in [8] . The k-unicast problem is a well known open problem in the study of network codes [8] - [12] .
In this work, we seek to make progress in the apparently difficult generalization from the scenario where only the source can generate random keys to the scenario where all nodes can generate keys by studying the case where only a single node can generate keys but allowing that single node to be arbitrary. Our central result is a characterization of the capacity-security region in the unicast (single-source single-terminal) setting when only a single network node K = S ∈ V can generate random keys.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we present our model and preliminary notation. Our main result, the capacity-security characterization of the networks at hand, appears in Section III. The characterization is combinatorial in nature and involves different cut-set bounds between the source node, the key generating node, and the terminal node. Achievability is proven in Section IV via a reduction from secure communication over G to multi-source multi-cast network coding over a modified network G * as shown in Figure 1b . The converse proof, which is based on cutset bounds, appears in Section V. Due to space limitations, the proofs of some of our lemmas and claims are presented in the full version of this work [13] . Finally, we conclude in Section VII.
II. NETWORK MODEL
Our system model consists of the following components:
(a) A finite directed acyclic graph G = {V, E}. We assume that each edge e ∈ E noiselessly transmits one unit of information (i.e., one field element in a given field F q ) per unit time. We use multiple edges to model an edge with the ability to communicate more than one information symbol per unit time. (c) A terminal node T ∈ V, which is required to decode all the messages generated by the source S with zero error. (d) A node K ∈ V, which generates a random "key" vector, N = N 1 , · · · , N |N | T with N 1 , · · · , N |N | independently and uniformly distributed over the field F q with N independent of M . (e) An eavesdropper that can access any subset W ⊂ E of edges for which |W| ≤ z.
In the following subsections, we introduce our definition of a network code and discuss the notions of topological order and cut sets.
A. Network Code
We define a scalar linear network code N for the network G to be an assignment of a linear encoding function f e to each edge e ∈ E and a linear decoding function g T to terminal T . For e ∈ E, we denote the edge message on e by X e , and for any set A ⊆ E, we define X A = {X e : e ∈ A}. If e ∈ E and e = (u, v) then the edge message X e is a linear combination of all the messages carried by the edges in In(u) = {(w, u) : (w, u) ∈ E}, the incoming edges of u. The edge message at e is obtained using local encoding at u. We define X e using the local encoding functionf e on e = (u, v) as
Here, X e denotes the message on edge e, for each edge e ∈ In(u), X e denotes the messages on edges e ,c e ,e is the coefficient acting on each message X e . If edge e is an outgoing edge of S (or K), then X e is a function of the source messages (or keys) as well. Given, such a network code, an adversary that wiretaps any size-z subset of edges W ⊂ E would obtain the information X W on the wiretapped edges. A network code is said to be (R, z)-feasible if
where T is the terminal node and M is the R-dimensional message vector generated by the source S.
B. Topological Order
To achieve secure communication over the network G, the source S must "mix" the message symbols in M with the random key symbols in N . This mixture of messages and keys is communicated to the terminal T , which must decode correctly to reconstruct message M . Let V = {v 0 , ..., v n−1 }. Since G is directed and acylic, we assume, without loss of generality, that the nodes v i ∈ V are indexed according to their topological order in G. This implies that the node v i receives its incoming information only from nodes v 0 , · · · , v i−1 . We also assume that the index of K in this topological order is less than that of S which in turn is less than that of the terminal T . More specifically, we assume K = v 0 , S = v m , and
There is no loss of generality in these assumptions as otherwise, either transmissions on outgoing edges of S cannot be secure or the communication rate R between S and T is zero. This implies that nodes {v 0 , . . . , v m−1 } only transmit, on their outgoing edges, functions of the information generated by K while nodes {v m , . . . , v n−1 } may potentially transmit functions of the information generated at both S and K.
C. The Cut Sets
For any pair of nodes u, v ∈ V, a cut is a set of edges in E which, when removed, disconnects all paths from u to v. The cut with the minimum capacity that separates u and v is denoted as mincut G (u, v). Since each edge in E is assumed to be of unit capacity, |mincut G (u, v)| represents the total capacity of all the edges in mincut G (u, v). The cuts as defined above may also separate sets of nodes in the network G. For a subset of nodes A, the set mincut G (A, v) is the minimum capacity cut that separates the set of nodes in A ⊂ V from the node v ∈ V. For the network G, we use the following notation
III. RESULTS
In this work we prove the following theorem. 
The proof of Theorem 1 is divided into two parts, the achievability proof, shown in Section IV, and the converse proof shown in Section V.
IV. PROOF OF THEOREM 1: ACHIEVABILITY
Proof. For the network G = (E, V) with source node S and key generating node K holding R message symbols M and z key symbols N respectively, we set the values of integers R and z such that they satisfy the bounds (4), (5) , and (6) . We implement a random linear network code N over G and over a sufficiently large field F q such that, for any edge e = (u, v) ∈ E, the local encoding coefficients {c e ,e } e ∈In(u) associated with edge e, as described in (1), are i.i.d. and uniform over F q .
The network code N is said to be decodable at rate R over network G, if it satisfies the condition of (2). We consider the following lemma which we prove in Section VI-A. Lemma 1. Given integers R, z that satisfy (4)-(6) of Theorem 1, the random linear network coding scheme N is decodable at rate R with probability at least 1 − 2(|E| + R + z) 2 q .
We now consider a wiretapping adversary that can eavesdrop on any subset of edges W ⊂ E such that |W| = z. We denote the information gleaned by the adversary as X W which may be expressed as
Here, A W and B W are z × R and z × z matrices whose rows are global encoding vectors associated with each edge in W, acting on M and N , respectively. We consider the network coded information to be secure if and only if (3) holds for any W ⊂ E of size z, i.e. the adversary gains no information about the source message symbols M even after wiretapping a z-sized subset of edges in the network. In [3] , Cai and Yeung show that a linear network coding scheme is secure if and only if the following condition holds.
Here, rk(.) denotes the rank of a matrix.
The following lemma is proven in Section VI-B by analyzing the matrices A W and B W . A network code is said to be (R, z)-feasible if it is both R-feasible and z-secure. It now follows that, given integers R and z that satisfy (4), (5) , and (6), the suggested network code is (R, z)-feasible with probability at least
which, for sufficiently large q, implies our achievability with high probability.
V. PROOF OF THEOREM 1: CONVERSE
Proof. We prove the converse for any (not necessarily linear) (R, z)-feasible network code N over the network G. We start with an (R, z)-feasible coding scheme and show that R and z satisfy the bounds of (4), (5) and (6) . Here, we give a partial proof in which we only address bound (4) . Proofs of a similar nature apply to the other bounds as well. Details appear in the full version of this work [13] . We denote by C K−S , the minimum cut separating K and S and by C K−S , the total capacity of the edges in C K−S . The random variable X K−S , over the support set X K−S , represents the information on all of the edges of C K−S . We denote by W any subset of z edges in E that is wiretapped by an eavesdropping adversary. Then X W denotes the encoded information on all the edges in W. We denote the set of edges that are incoming to S as In(S), and the encoded information on all of the edges in In(S) as X In(s) with support set X In(S) . Similarly, for Out(S).
For the bound z ≤ min(C K−S , C K−T ) we consider two cases. First, assume by contradiction that z > C K−S . Specifically set z = C K−S + 1. This implies that the eavesdropping adversary may choose to wiretap all the edges in C K−S and an edge e ∈ Out(S) to obtain the wiretap set W = C K−S ∪ {e} of size z. Then the wiretapped information is X W = (X K−S , X e ), where X e is the information on the chosen edge e. Note that X e =f e (X S ), where, X S := (M, X In(S) ) is the information present at the source S.
For z-security, we require that the mutual information I(M ; X W ) = 0. Therefore, I(M ; X W ) = I(M ; X K−S ) + I(M ; X e |X K−S ) = 0, implying that, I(M ; X K−S ) = 0 and I(M ; X e |X K−S ) = 0. Thus, we conclude that H(X e |X K−S ) = H(X e |X K−S , M ).
Suppose that cut C K−S partitions G into disjoint subnetworks A and A C , where A includes the key generating node K. Note that any information communicated through edges in A C must be a function of X K−S . In addition, In(S) ⊂ C K−S ∪ E A C , implying that all information reaching S is a function of X K−S . We conclude, for any edge e ∈ Out(S), that
where, h e is some deterministic function. Equation (9) implies that H(X e |X K−S , M ) = 0 which in turn implies H(X e |X K−S ) = 0. This means that to be z-secure the information X K−S must completely determine X e for any e ∈ Out(S). As I(M ; X K−S ) = 0 shows that X K−S is independent of M , it follows that for any edge e ∈ Out(S), the information X e is also independent of M and thus I(M ; X Out(S) ) = 0. This, in turn, implies that the rate realizable by the network code N is R = 0 which is a contradiction. A similar proof holds for z ≤ C K−T , in which we study the set W = C K−T ∪ {e} for any edge e ∈ In(T ).
VI. PROOF OF LEMMAS

A. Proof of Lemma 1
We begin by considering the modified network G * = (V * , E * ), obtained from G as shown in Figure 1b . Specifically, G * is obtained from G by adding a new node T * and R + z parallel edges from S to T * . As in G, the network G * has nodes S and K holding R symbols of M and z symbols of N , respectively. Here, the outgoing edges of S include those in the original network G, denoted as Out(S), and the additional R + Z edges. Both terminals T and T * want to decode all R symbols of M and z symbols of N . A network code, over G * , that satisfies the demands of terminals T and T * is a multi-source multicast network code which is R-feasible, where R = (R, z).
We use a random linear multi-source multicast network code N * over network G * and the finite field F q . In what follows, we set some notation.
1. Let O K |Out(K)|, I S |In(S)| and O S |Out(S)|.
The node K transmits z linear combinations of N through
Out(K). We express the information on these edges as X Out(K) = B K N . Here, the rows of B K , which is an O K × z matrix, are the local encoding vectors associated with each edge in Out(K). The entries of B K are i.i.d. and uniform over the field F q . 3. The message source S receives I S linear combinations of N through the edges in In(S). We express the information on these edges as X In(S) = V In(S) B K N . V In(S) is an I S × O K matrix, and the rows of V In(S) B K are the global encoding vectors, associated with each edge in In(S), acting on N . 4. S "mixes" the received I S symbols of X In(S) with the R symbols of M and transmits the resulting combinations through Out(S) and to T * . We express the information on Out(S) as
Here, the rows of the matrix A S B S are the local encoding vectors associated with the edges in Out(S). We now consider the following claims. Claim 2 is proven in the full version of this work [13] .
Claim 1. The multi-source multicast random linear network code N * , as described above, is R-feasible over the network G * with probability at least 1 − 2(|E| + R + z) 2 q .
Proof of Claim 1. Given integers R and z, we start by observing the min-cut capacities in G * between the subsets of the node set {S, K} and each terminal T and T * as follows.
From (10)- (15) , we see that for all source-terminal pairs in G * , the corresponding Min-Cut Max-Flow bounds are satisfied.
Let L be the total number of encoding coefficients employed over all the edges in E * . We can bound L by e∈E * |E * | ≤ |E * | 2 = (|E|+R+z) 2 . Using Theorem 8 of [14] and Theorem 5.4 of [15] (derived from [16] ), we have that the network code N * is R-feasible over the network G * with probability at least
This proves the claim.
Claim 2. The R-feasible network code N * over G * , when restricted to G, implies that N is R-decodable over G.
From Claim 1 and Claim 2, we have that the network code N is R-decodable over G with probability at least
This proves the lemma.
B. Proof of Lemma 2
We use the notation introduced in the proof of Lemma 1. For any edge e ∈ E, we express the information on e as,
Here, u e is an edge-e encoding vector of dimension O K +O S , acting on X Out(K) and X Out(S) . We partition u e = u K u S such that the O K -dimensional vector u K acts on the information from Out(K) and the O S -dimensional vector u S acts on the information from Out(S). Thus, we rewrite (16) as follows.
We now consider an adversary that wiretaps any subset W ⊂ E of edges such that |W| = z. Then, using (17), we obtain the information observed by the adversary as follows.
We assume that U K U S has full row-rank of z, as otherwise, the adversary could simply drop an edge in W and not lose any information. Using (17), we rewrite (18) as follows.
From (7) and (19), we have that
. From our decodability proof, we know that rk(V In(S) ) = z, as otherwise, T * could not have decoded the keys N . For the security condition of (8) to hold, we show that rk(B W ) = rk(ΦB K ) = z. Therefore, we compute the following. We now consider the following claims proven in the full version of this work [13] .
Given an n × m matrix A and an m × n matrix B such that rk(A) = n and the entries of B are i.i.d. and uniform over the field F q , then rk(AB) = n with probability at least 1 − n q , over B.
Let us consider the following event.
• E W : The condition of (8) holds for a given wiretap set W of size z. Using Claim 3 and Claim 4 we conclude from (20) that Pr BK ,BS
Denoting the complementary event of E W byĒ W and using the union bound over eventĒ W for any W ⊂ E of size z, we have the following.
Namely, the probability of the network code being secure against an adversary with a wiretap set W of size z is at
. This proves the lemma.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we characterize the capacity-security region for single unicast network codes over a directed acyclic network in which only one node, which is not necessarily the source node, can generate random keys. We present a random linear achievability proof and a matching coverse proof. Our converse can be extended to cyclic networks as well. (Details appear in the full version of this work [13] .) Our work establishes an intermediate step between the well understood problem of characterizing the capacity-security region in which only the source node generates random keys and the problem of characterizing the capacity-security region when every node can generate random keys.
Several problems are left open. An extension of our result to the context of multicast network coding is within reach and the subject of future research. It would also be interesting to extend our achievability to single unicast network coding over networks with cycles. Additional possible extensions include the study of single unicast networks in which more than one node can independently generate random keys.
